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Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MELVIN L. MATLOCK, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 14107 
COMES NOW the Defendant and Appellant, Government Employees 
Insurance Company, and petitions the Court for a Rehearing of the above-
entitled matter. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT BECAUSE 
GEICO KNEW THE INSURED HAD SOME OF HIS 
VEHICLES INSURED WITH ANOTHER COMPANY 
PRIOR TO THE TIME OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE 
1951 CHEVROLET 1 1/2 TON TRUCK AND WITH THIS 
KNOWLEDGE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE THE POLICY 
PREMIUMS, IT HAD A DUTY TO WARN THE INSURED 
THAT THE PROVISION IN THE POLICY PERTAINING TO 
30 DAY AUTOMATIC COVERAGE WOULD BE USED TO 
DEFEAT A CLAIM WHICH MIGHT BE MADE UNDER 
THE POLICY AND NOT HAVING DONE SO WAIVED 
THE PROVISION. 
The policy provided that all vehicles owned by the insured must be 
insured with Geico in order for the 30 day automatic coverage provision to apply. 
There is no dispute that three of the insureds vehicles were insured with another 
company. Assume that Geico was aware of this fact because it was in their file 
material. In all fairness we would have to assume that the insured was aware 
of the fact that the policy provided automati c coverage only if all vehicles were 
insured with Geico. In addition to the provision in the policy, plaintiff's 
Exhibit "C", Policy Change Request Form, which the insured had in his possession 
IMPORTANT^ 
YOUR POLICY PROVIDES AUTOMATIC INSURANCE FOR A NEWLY 
ACQUIRED AUTOMOBILE, whether it replaces one described in your policy or is 
an additional car, provided we insure all automobiles owned by you as of the delivery 
date of an additional auto and GEICO* IS NOTIFIED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF 
DELIVERY. * 1 _ PI: Exh. "C" 
Does the company have an additional duty to repeat to the insured 
the facts that have already been made plain to him? It shouldn't have. 
While insurance companies are allowed to give rate inducements 
to policyholders who cover more than one car with the company, it would appear 
to be a restraint of trade to require an insured to insure all of his cars with the 
same company or none at all or to cancel out an insured who insured some of his 
cars with another company. The insuring of all cars with the same company is a 
condition precedent to an insured having the benefit of the 30 day automatic 
insurance clause but this is based upon practical reasons pertaining to amounts 
and kinds of coverage. 
The alternative is that the insurance does not become effective 
ti l l the company receives and accepts the application for insurance. 
In order for the company to waive this provision there would have 
to have been a duty upon the company to take some additional action toward 
the insured. The opinion says the insurance company waived the provision by 
not warning the insured it would reject a claim which might be made under the 
policy. 
The company has warned the insured of the fact that unless his 
vehicles are all insured by Geico the 30 day automatic coverage will not apply. 
The Court has not indicated in the opinion what type of objection 
would be required and no case was cited by plaint iffs counsel and none by the 
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Court to support a finding that such a duty existed. 
The case of Boling v . State Farm Mutual Insurance Co, , 466 S.W. 2d, 
696 (Mo. ,1971) cited by the Court is not in point and does not support the Court's 
decis ion. In that case there was a dispute as to whether a 1966 Buick which was 
titled in the name of Hunt Materials , a corporation, which paid for the car, or 
Paul Hunt was the insured. Paul Hunt was president and general manager of 
Hunt Materials , I n c . , and used the car in connection with his business and 
individually. The policy application was made out by State Farm Mutual1 s agent 
and he filled in the application: "Hunt, Paul, d . b . a . Hunt Materials , Inc . " 
There was , thus an ambiguity in the name of the insured and the 
Court held that the corporation which was the owner of the car was the insured, 
construing the policy against the company. 
position of Geico. The vehicle was reg is -
This case actually supports the ^ S T ^ E O F C O L O R A D O 
CERTIFICATE Of TITLE TO A MOTO* VEHICLE 
tered in Matlock's name and M & M 
Orchards is not and was not a corporation. 
There was no question of waiver in this 
case and no question of the 30 day 
automatic coverage c lause . The case does 
not support plaintiff's position. 
The Court seems to place 
some importance upon the fact that the 
company knew that the insured had some of 
his automobiles insured with another 
s 
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company. This does not have any significance unless there is some evidence 
that the insurance company, with that knowledge, nevertheless extended on 
prior occas ions , the automatic coverage to the insured inspite of the fact that 
he did not qualify for i t . There is no proof whatever that this had occurred. 
In connection with the vehicles acquired for use on the farm, the 
1951 Chevrolet was the only "additional" vehicle sought to be insured as an 
additional vehicle. 
The first vehicle used on the farm was a 1963 Chevrolet 3/4 ton 
pickup truck insured by Geico in August of 1963, but placed on the farm some-
time after May of 1964. (R 119). At this t ime, he a lso had one or more passenger 
vehicles insured with Geico. (R 124 L 10) on the same policy. (R 134 L 9) 
The next vehicle he insured with Geico for farm use was a 1971 
Ford 3/4 ton pickup truck which replaced the 1963 Chevrolet. (Defendant's 
Exhibit "4".) This was not an additional vehicle within the terms of the policy, 
but was qualified a s an owned automobile because it replaced an automobile 
covered under the policy and it was covered under the terms of the policy as 
a replacement vehicle by application. See Defendant's Exhibit " 4 . " 
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MELVIN L. MATLOCK, M. D. 
»41S HARRISON BLVD. 
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The next vehicle acquired by the insured for use on the farm was 
the 1951 Chevrolet 1 1/2 ton truck in issue in this c a s e . It was acquired on 
January 5, 1973. This was an additional vehicle and the only additional vehicle 
under the terms of the policy acquired for use on the farm. 
However, during this same period of time, the insured had a 1967 
Pontiac insured with Geico under the same policy. (Defendant's Exhibit "7") 
He had a 1963 Corvette insured with Geico under this policy that was involved 
in a 1965 accident in Ogden. (R 128, L 14). 
On August 21 , 1972, the insured requested insurance from Geico 
on a 1972 Chevrolet 3/4 ton pickup on which he had a camper, the same being 
kept in Pocatello, Idaho. Coverage was to be and was covered by Geico under 
the same policy, (Defendant's Exhibit "D-l") Neither the company or the 
insured treated the policy a s an exclusive farm policy. It was in fact a family 
automobile policy. Farm and passenger cars were insured on the same policy. 
The only vehicle insured with Geico by Dr. Matlock which did not 
qualify as a passenger , farm or utility type vehicle at any time, was the 1951 
1 1/2 ton truck and Geico did not give it automatic coverage because Dr. Matlock 
was not entitled to it under the terms of the policy. 
On what facts then did the trial Court base i ts findings that the 
company waived this provision. The statement of the trial Court that it finds 
the company waived this provision is not supported byanyfactual evidence and 
should not be accepted by the appellate Court because the record does not 
support i t . All vehicles of Matlock insured by Geico were insured by the same 
Geico policy. What specific conduct of the company waived the policy terms? 
- 5 -
As Justice Ellett has stated in his d issent , it is impractical and 
unfair to the insurance company to put a burden of giving additional notice to 
the insured that he will fail to qualify for the automatic 30 day coverage clause 
because he has insured some of his vehicles with another company. He had 
his policy and his policy change request form, both of which advised him of 
that fact. Why do we excuse Dr. Matlock from this knowledge. He, in fact, 
is the one who waived the right to the 30 day automatic coverage provision, not 
the company. He has the burden of bringing himself within the terms of the 
policy. 
The Court should reverse itself on this finding and holding. 
POINT II . THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE 
WEIGHT PROVISION OF 1500 LBS PERTAINING 
TO FARM VEHICLES WAS ONLY A GUIDE LINE 
WHICH WAS NOT ENFORCED IN THE PAST AND 
WAS THEREFORE WAIVED. 
With respect to Point II above, the t r i a l Court found and the 
Supreme Court in i ts opinion has affirmed the trial Court's finding that the 
weight provision contained in the policy was only a guide line which the 
defendant had not enforced in the pas t . However, the record clearly shows 
that prior to the time the 1951 Chevrolet 1 1/2 ton truck was insured, the 
only vehicles for which the insured had applied for coverage were passenger cars 
or 3/4 ton pickup t rucks . Dr. Matlock testified a s follows: 
Q. You have not prior to the time that you sent notice of the 
1 1/2 ton 1951 Chevrolet truck insured any vehicle with Geico 
other than the 1/2 ton or 3/4 ton pickup in the truck variety have you? 
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' MELVIN L. MATLOCK M. D. 
1541 EAST CLARK 
POCATELVO. IDAHO 83201 , 
TELEPHONE 232-7760 yjf r~ *2 J S S V *~" 
^6j*6if S-/,'/ ' 
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^ H W ^ ' ^ 14-^ %> 
~*Ki\H rKJK KLrVKt / / V L J — ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Page 3 
ADDITIONAL AUTOA B^ILE 
USE THIS PAGE TO REPORT AN ADDITIONAL AUTO 
/ / the rt* tvly acquired auto replaces an auto already insured on your CEICO 
~ To pe sure of the lowest possible rates, please answer all questions. 
I . J D E N T I F I C A T I O N V 
\d...J.A.M^A^<X.. ./. ^ Policy Ka&0A.J£~7£.':L 
Residence AddrcsrCNo. & St.^J^ST^.^Ai^^^.M^ity- & SutcfoCu£7ttJ,£^/J<fc?p # . ^ K j Z T 
Mailing Address (if different than above)/£jjf / £,. C^ >?£>(.City & St^Jfe./t./Zs^ZtL S/<M./?&v #%32-<!>.'/...... 
Telephone Number (Residence)..Xa7.^/9.71^.. ./.X..."ZI... ( D u s i n c s s X ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T^rrrzr^:. 
C h e c k h e r e if t h e a b o v e a d d r e s s e s arc n e w a n d h a v e n o t a j r e a d v ^ b c e n r e p o r t e d . ^ . R e s i d e n c e A d d r e s s ^ M a i l i n g A d d r e s s 
ri^ ^m*^^ 
Make . Trjiic Name) No. L>l. Bodv Stvie (4-Door. Hard Top. Sta. Wfin.. etc.) 
?T • ' • ""' ~ " 
• _ y ' _ _4_ _M*tIcl Jjmriila. F-85. etc.) \ 
i^ -j^ ^r^^ 
Serial or Identification Number Recorded on Registration Caru / | / PurchaseNpate f State In \*hic 
\jyL£jL?.3r.S.-=:L3Loo £ 
Name and Address ot person or deafer from whom car was purchasill: 
-f&U&4 C/i0/frl>£T j6o/Ujr< 
>/ /jday IjitJ^ 
Ijij  
rbt-'t ro/yJ> /fZAn/cty/hay/ 
so le reg i s tered o w n e r of car ( e x c l u d i n g f W 
__^ ich Auto Will gc Registered 
q u7ed I J^cL/fJTd 
i%5 AND LATER MODF.L AUTOMOBILES: 
Give exact horsepower if over 300. 
JF A* COMPACT AUTOMOBILE: 
Check if horsepower is over 130; or 125 (in Colo. 
• A r e y o u the f ( e x c l u d i r ^ , £ r f f r i C ^ ^ r n p a n y ) ? If " N o , " s h o w o w n e r s h i p b e l o w : 
Name of registered g %Z*< /^MA^^Ar^X,./^.. Rcktto f yo* 
• If A u t o is regis tered in N e w York , g i v t y r e c i s t c r e d o w ^ e > ^ S o c i a l S e c u r i t y - N u m b e r ..TTD ) . . . \ r 
II. FINANCED AUTO / / C{AI_ ( ^ ) ~" f^C1' J ^ f\ 
If your po l i cy inc ludes , or if you are r£quc4ring C o m p r e h e n s i v e and C o l l i s t o ^ C o v e r a g c s , and the car is financed, jplease insert b e l o w the 
n a m e a n d address of the f inance c o m p a n y or bank s o that w e m a y s e n d t h e m ^ n l T n e T r s O T y ^ v i d e n c c o f i n s t f r a n t e / 
NAME OF FINANCE COMR 4 AMY OR BANK 
/l/W N O . & S T J V V/V } s CITY & STATE " "... \ ZIP # Note: Nfost hanks and finance companies require that you carry both Comprehensive and,Collision coverag£S-jvhen a car is financed. 
r
 I I I . COVERAGES | | 
• Ind ica te by c h e c k m a r k the c o v e r a g e s that y o u w i s h t o h a v e o n your n e w l y acqu ired car. T h e a d d i t i o n a l insurance w i l l b e a d d e d 
t o the present po l i cy pro rata so that all c o v e r a g e s w i l l b e c o n t a i n e d in a s i n g l e p o l i c y a n d w i l l h a v e t h e s a m e e x p i r a t i o n date . 
( C o v e r a g e s are subject to your approva l after the p r e m i u m a m o u n t is d e t e r m i n e d . ) ' 
S A M E C O V E R A G E A S C A R R I E D O N • C A R I G C A R 2 • C A R 3 , O R ; 
B o d i l y I n j u r y L i a b i l i t y D $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 and $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 • $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 and $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 Q $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 a n d $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 Q $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 and $ 5 0 , 0 0 ^ 
• $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 and S 1 0 0 . 0 0 0 £ < °~f L 3CO c-c-CC<~ 
P r o p e r t y D a m a g e • $ 5 , 0 0 0 Each A c c i d e n t • $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 Each A c c i d e n t J & $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 Each A c c i d e n t 
A u t o m o b i l e M e d i c a l [J $ 1 , 0 0 0 Each Person • $ 2 , 0 0 0 Each P e r s o n [J $ 3 , 0 0 0 Each P e r s o n M $ 5 , 0 0 0 Each Person 
U n i n s u r e d M o t o r i s t s j§3 ( N o t e : N o t avai lable in Canal Z o n e , G u a m , N e w f o u n d l a n d o r P u e r t o R i c o . ) 
C o m p r e h e n s i v e , F i r e , T h e f t ^Q N o n - D e d u c t i b l e • $ 5 0 D e d u c t i b l e 
C o l l i s i o n n $ 2 5 D e d u c t i b l e • $ 5 0 D e d u c t i b l e JSJ $ 1 0 0 D e d u c t i b l e 
T o w i n g & L a b o r C o s t s N f $ 2 5 Per D i s a b l e m e n t 
IV. C L A S S I F I C A T I O N . Complete this section as it applies to ALL Drivers (except self) of ALL GEIC0 insured autos. 
Names of Drivers other than the 
Insured who operate your cars 
t&fq- MTLocK f't-m f. 
Date of 
Birth 
Male or 
Female 
k^r 
Relation 
to You 
Occupation* 
(If student, show grade 
/fcMg 
Reside 
with You? 
Yes—No 
-)/£*-
Married 
or 
Single 
/ * 
Years 
Driving 
Experience 
JXL 
Percentage of Use by 
Each Driver for Each Car _ 
Car I | Car Yl Car"3 
SZ *4-
Driver 
Training 
Yes—No 
Ad 
•If student is away at school, indicate distance of sthool from your home mi. (If more than one student, give information on separate sheet.) 
• I f a u t o d r i v e n t o a n d f r o m s c h o o l : W h o d r i v e s ? 
H o w o f t e n ? M i l e s o n e w a y ? ' 
COMrLfcTE FOR ALL CARS 
D o y o u d r i v e t o and from work ( i n c l u d i n g part w a y to bus 
o r train d e p o t , or fr inge p a r k i n g area)>? . 
( a ) D a y s per w e e k auro is dr iven to work , and 
( b ) O n e w a y d r i v i n g d i s tance to work. __ 
| Is a u t o used in bus iness o ther than d r i v i n g to and from work?^ • Y E S • N O 
^ t t o n j o T a ^ 
CAR 1 
YR. MAKE 
"D'YES" 0 NO 
i C . D a y s M i . 
CAR 2 
YR. MAKE 
.<J>. .Days . . . r .? . .Mi . 
Q Y E S " j g , N O 
CAR 3 
YR. JVfAKE _ 
n"YES~"n NO" 
D a y s M i . 
• YES~D~NO 
(.Note: For additional juto, five description and use on a separate sheet.) 
A. I have not insured any other truck prior to that t ime. 
Q. That is any other truck over the 1/2 ton or 3/4 ton? 
A. That is t rue. 
Q. No one from Geico ever checked your vehicle to determine 
what their capacity or rating was , did they? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
(R. 142, L 25 - 143.) 
The first vehicle used on the farm was a 1963 3/4 ton Chevrolet pickup 
truck and the next one was a 3/4 Ton Ford pikcup truck. (Defendant's Exhibit "1") 
On what facts did the trial Court make its finding that the company waived this 
provision. The only vehicle which did not qualify weight wise was the 1 1/2 ton 
Chevrolet 1951 truck and the company did not afford this vehicle automatic coverage 
but placed the insurance on the vehicle the first day it could have received the 
application, to-wit: April 8th. This certainly did not constitute a waiver. There 
is no evidence whatever to support the finding that this provision was not enforced 
by the company. 
The Court's finding should be reversed. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT THE 
COMPANY WAIVED ANY DEFENSES IT HAD BECAUSE 
IT INVESTIGATED THE CLAIM AND ITS AGENTS 
LED THE INSURED TO BELIEVE THAT PAYMENT 
WOULD BE MADE AND FURTHER THAT A CORRECTED 
POLICY WAS ISSUED COVERING THE VEHICLE AT 
THE TIME OF LOSS. 
In his request for coverage on the 1951 Chevrolet 1 1/2 ton truck, the 
insured requested the same coverage as on the 1971 Ford truck. That vehicle had 
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coverage for liability and $5,000 medical pay. The same coverage was placed 
on the 1951 1 1/2 ton truck by the company as of the 8th of April, 1974. See 
pla int i f fs Exhibit "B". 
After the accident occurred the insured made application to Geico for 
the medical pay benefits under the policy. See Exhibit "O", a letter dated 
July 9, 1973, from which I quote beginning on the bottom of page 2: 
There is a claim for medical payments being processed at 
this time for payments in behalf of Mr. Jim Horton of the 
above address who was injured in the accident of April 7th. 
Signed Melvin L. Matlock. 
When the company refused to make payment of the medical bills and 
denied coverage by letter dated May 6, 1975, Dr. Matlock then filed this 
declaratory judgment act ion. Suit was commenced with service of summons on the 
Insurance Commissioner on June 19th, 1974. The suit involving liability coverage 
was served on Dr. Matlock on September 4 , 1974 and the defense tendered to 
Geico on September 5, 1974, which was refused on the basis there was no coverage. 
There is no evidence that any one knew about the liability claim prior to the time 
that that suit was filed. 
The Court has indicated in i ts opinion that agents of the defendant 
led the plaintiff to believe that payment of the claim against the policy would be 
made. The only claim that was being made was a claim for medical payments. The 
bills incurred on behalf of Horton were covered for the most part by a Blue Cross 
Blue Shield policy with some balance being paid by Dr. Matlock. There were no 
representations made by the company or any agent which induced either Mr. Horton 
or Dr. Matlock to incur any medical bil ls that would not otherwise have been 
- 8 -
* * * * * 
^OKJIS \*S" 
GENERAL CHANGE ENDORSEMENT FAMILY AUTOMOBILE POLICY DECLARATIONS 
) / POLICY PERIOD (MONIh. DAY VEADi 
»-m-?t. - iV 
ENDORSEMENT ISSUE DATE 
• ub-Ofi-73 
ENDORSEMENT EFFECTIVE DATE 
«^0M-06 -73 
(12.01 A.M., STANDARD TIME) 
ITEM 2. 
0 3 - 3 0 - 7 3 03-30-7M FROM .""• -"" ' J TO 
12:01 A.M.. STANDARD TIME AT THE ADDRESS CF 'HE NAMED 
INSURED AS STATED HEREIN. 
ITEM 1. 
NAMED 
INSURED 
AND 
ADDRESS 
ItlELVIN L MATLOCK 
f1& fl ORCHARDS 
P0 bOX b 
MLTA CO fimiL 
L 
~1 
J 
THIS ENDORSEMENT REFLECTS THE CURRENT STATUS AND n n 
FORMS A PART OF THE POLICY AS NUMBERED HEREIN ^ J 
ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE 
COMPANY TO THE INSURED NAMED IN ITEM I AND IS 
EFFECTIVE AS OF 12:01 A.M., STANDARD TIME O N THE DATE 
INDICATED. 
ITEM la . THE OWNED AUTOMOBILE WILL BE PRINCIPAL.Y GARAGED IN THE TOWN 
AND STATE DESIGNATED IN ITEM 1. UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED HEREIN. 
J OF OWNED AUTOMOBILE(S) OR TRAILER(S) 
TRADE NAME 
F0RD/PU 
CHEV/CAOP 
CHcV 
IDENTIFICATION NO. MODEL, BODY STYLE 
FE5YKK031US < 
CCEd4£SJi310bM 
JfcAlG7004£ 
CYL DATE PURCHASED CLASS 
FR-
NR-
LR-
SYMBOL 
3C 
72 
^JCE AFFORDED IS ONLY WITH RESPECT TO SUCH OF THE FOLLOWING COVERAGES AS ARE INDICATED BY LIMITS OF LIABILITY INSERTED HEREIN. THE LIMIT OF 
MY'S LIABILITY AGAINST EACH SUCH COVERAGE SHALL BE AS STATED HEREIN, SUBJECT TO ALL TbtffERMS OF THIS POLICY HAVING REFERENCE THERETO. 
UNIT 1. 
IMITS OF LIABILITY 
SON j EACH OCCURRENCE 
Cu-iCiGGi
 $ 30CnOG0 
CURRENCE 
DiQQC 
ISON 
,000 
SON 1 EACH ACCIDENT 
1 
1 $ 
r$ CTUAL 
ASH 
ALUE 
ACTUAL 
CASH VALUE. 
LESS$50DED. 
(2) 
$100 
ASH VALUE, OR STATED AMOUNT 
ASH VALUE. LESS 
3
 DEDUCTIBLE 
125 PER DISABLEMENT 
;EE ENDORSEMENTS 
UNIT 2. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
EACH PERSON [ EACH OCCURRENCE 
$ 1QG-.0Q0; $ 3CQ-.D00 
EACH OCCURRENCE 
$ 2S-.00G 
EACH PERSON 
$ 5-.00Q 
EACH PERSON j EACH ACCIDENT 
$ J $ 
r$ (i) TC ACTUAL CASH 
VALUE 
ACTUAL 
CASH VALUE. 
LESS$50DED 
(2) 
$100 
ACTUAL CASH VALUE. OR STATED AMOUNT 
$ 
ACTUAL CASH VALUE, LESS 
$ 1 Q 0 DEDUcTIBLE 
X $25 PER DISABLEMENT 
SEE ENDORSEMENTS 
f UNIT 3. 
LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
EACH PERSON j EACH OCCURRENCE 
$ 1Q0-.000I $ 30CU000 
EACH OCCURRENCE 
$ 10iQ00 
EACH PERSON 
$ S-.00Q 
EACH PERSON | EACH ACCIDENT 
$ _] $ 
1 $ 
(II 
. ACTUAL 
CASH 
VALUE 
ACTUAL 
CASH VALUE. 
LESS$50DED 
(2) 
$100 
ACTUAL CASH VALUE. OR STATED AMOUNT 
$ 
ACTUAL CASH VALUE, LESS 
$ DEDUCTIBLE 
$25 PER DISABLEMENT 
SEE ENDORSEMENTS 
COVERAGES 
A BODILY INJURY 
A
" LIABILITY 
n PROPERTY DAMAGE 
D
 LIABILITY 
C " MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
J - UNINSURED MOTORISTS 
(1) BODILY INJURY 
(2) PROPERTY DAMAGE 
, , (1) COMPREHENSIVE. FiRE & THEFT 
H - (EXCLUDING COLLISION) 
(2) PERSONAL EFFECTS 
_ (I) FIRE. LIGHTNING AND 
Q - TRANSPORTATION (2) THEFT 
(3) COAABINED ADDITIONAL 
E - COLLISION 
| - TOWING AND LABOR COSTS 
MISCELLANEOUS 
1 
1 
A l b 
A l t 
FORM NUMBERS 
OF ENDORSEMENTS 
ATTACHED TO POLICY 
OSS UNDER PART III IS PAYABLE AS INTEREST MAY 
kR TO THE NAMED INSURED AND THELIENHOLDER 
!D HEREIN. 
OSS PAYABLE CLAUSE STATED ON THE REVERSE 
DP APPLIES IN FAVOR OF THE NAMED LIENHOLDER 
>S THE POLICY IS OTHERWISE ENDORSED. 
Plaintiffs 
Exhibit .£ 
CASE#. , 
DATE..J CS> .^ . . . .<:5.C . . .2 .Z~ 
RECEIVED 
incurred no matter what the alleged representations may have been on the part 
of Geico, and if there was a representation, it did not influence the amount of 
the medical bills which were incurred. Dr. Matlock did not rely upon the 
insurance company for payment of the medical bills and did not at any time 
change his position to his prejudice by virtue of any rel iance. (R. 132.) None 
of the alleged conduct on the part of the insurer was outside the scope of that set 
forth in Section 31-19-34 Utah Code Annotated 1953 which states as follows: 
None of the following acts by or on behalf of an insurer 
shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of any provision 
of the policy or of any defense of the insurer thereunder; 
(1) acknowledgment of the receipt of notice of loss or of 
claim under the policy; (2) furnishing forms for reporting 
a loss or claim, for giving information relative thereto, 
or for making proof of loss or receiving or acknowledging 
receipt of any such form of proof filled out; (3) investigating 
any loss or claim under any policy or engaging in negotia-
tions looking toward a possible settlement of any such loss 
or claim. 
(The appellant refers the Court to pages 25 through 27 and 
pages 31 and 32 of i ts appellate brief with respect to waiver 
and the authority of an independent claims agent to waive 
any rights that the company had. There was no showing at 
any time that any adjuster or agent had authority to waive 
any policy provisions. The burden of proof was upon the 
insured to prove such authority and proof was not submitted.) 
There was never any claim that the company or any agent represented 
that a defense would be offered on behalf of Matlock in connection with any suit 
being contemplated by Horton and when the defense of the action was tendered to 
the company it was promptly rejected. 
The Court has stated that on October 29, 1973, defendant issued a 
corrected policy contract which recited that it was effective March 30, 1973 
through March 30, 1974. This policy ran at al l times from sometime in the 1950*3, 
- 9 -
when first purchased; March 30th, one year to March 30th, the following year. 
In determining whether or not the corrected policy afforded coverage on the 
1951 Chevrolet 1 1/2 ton truck it is necessary to take some other documents 
and matters into consideration. The initial endorsement establishing coverage 
set the coverage on April 8, 1973. If the automatic coverage provision had been 
in effect for the insured, the earliest date of coverage, based on the Court's 
decis ion, would have been April 6, 1973, when the vehicle was put in operation. 
There is no way that the insurance would have extended back to March 30, 1973. 
The company could not charge a premium back to March 30, 1973. The insured 
certainly would not have stood for such a charge. 
In plaintiff's Exhibit "V", dated September 24, 1973, which is a 
Geico gram addressed to Melvin L. Matlock pertaining to Policy No. 506-14-76-1 , 
the company stated: 
We are reinstating your policy effective July 1 1 , 1973 without 
a lapse in coverage. Effective October 25, 1972, we are 
deleting the 1972 Chevrolet camper and truck. Effective 
May 10, 1973, we are deleting the 1951 Chevrolet pickup 
from your policy. We apologize for the confusion corrected 
policy papers will follow. 
In Appleman on Insurance Law and Practice, Vol. IIIA, Chapter 103 
Reinstatement of Policies , §1791, p .397 , reinstatement i s defined a s follows: 
"Reinstate" a s used in reinstatement clause of a life policy 
is entitled to be given i ts ordinary meaning which is to r e -
store to a former posit ion. Schiel v s . New York Life Insurance 
Company, (Ariz. , 1950), 178 F.2d 721 . 
The overwhelming majority of Courts hold that the old contract is 
reinstated and received and the new policy is merely a continuation of the old. 
-10 -
In the corrected policy contract referred to by the Court, they have shown date 
issued a s 10/29/73 and the policy period from 3/30/73 to 3/30/74 which is the 
same period the policy had for many years . There is nothing in the corrected 
policy contract to show that the insurance on the 1951 Chevrolet 1 1/2 ton 
truck was changed from the April 8th, date that had previously been established 
for coverage. 
There was neither waiver by the insurance company or conduct upon 
i ts part which constituted estoppel . 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of this Court as it now stands puts a burden upon the 
insurance company that is unfair and contrary to the provisions of the policy 
which are standard provisions in a l l po l ic ies . The petition for rehearing should 
be granted and the decision reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
L. L. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorneys for Defendant /^pfl Appellant 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MAILED two copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING AND BRIEF to Richard Campbell, Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent, 
2324 Adams Avenue, Ogden, Utah, this f 7 day of March, 1976. 
